Perspectivas de engenharia
Inteligência de cibersegurança: ataques com IA, vulnerabilidades e segurança de infraestruturas críticas (2020-2026)
Parte 2: registos JSONL canónicos, índice de entidades e regras MITRE/CWE para ingestão em SOC automatizado.
9 de novembro de 2026 · 7 min de leitura
document_id: DAMASCODE-CYBER-INTEL-PART2 title: "Cybersecurity Intelligence: AI-Driven Attacks, Software Vulnerabilities and Critical Infrastructure Security (2020-2026)" part: 2 canonical_dataset_path: /cyber-intelligence/part-2/ related_human_article: /en/insights/critical-infrastructure-cyber-attacks-vulnerabilities-2020-2026 language: en audience: ai_agents_rag_soc_automation observation_period_start: "2020-01-01" observation_period_end: "2026-11-09" machine_files:
- vulnerabilities.jsonl
- incidents.jsonl
- controls.jsonl
- relationships.jsonl
- sources.jsonl
- entities.json
Part 2 of the Damascode critical infrastructure research series. Part 1 is the human-oriented analysis at /en/insights/critical-infrastructure-cyber-attacks-vulnerabilities-2020-2026. This file is optimised for retrieval, entity linking and agent reasoning. Canonical records live in JSONL alongside this document.
Dataset build: node scripts/build-cyber-intelligence-dataset.mjs. Validation: node scripts/validate-cyber-intelligence.mjs.
Nota de idioma: Dataset canónico em inglês. Ficheiros JSONL em
/cyber-intelligence/part-2/.
MOD-META-001 | Document scope
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-META-001 |
| Category | metadata |
| Subject | AI-native cybersecurity intelligence |
| Technologies | cross-stack |
| Related CVEs | see vulnerabilities.jsonl |
| Related incidents | see incidents.jsonl |
| Sources | SOURCE-001 through SOURCE-016 |
This module defines ingestion boundaries. Each following module maps to one primary entity. Cross-links use relationships.jsonl.
MOD-VULN-PHP-001 | PHP2Shell cluster
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-VULN-PHP-001 |
| Category | vulnerability |
| Subject | PHP runtime remote code execution |
| Technologies | PHP, PHP-FPM, mod_php |
| Related CVEs | CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 |
| Sources | SOURCE-001, SOURCE-002, SOURCE-003 |
Technical description. CVE-2026-109618 is memory corruption on OOM handling. CVE-2026-109619 is stale cross-request state usable as use-after-free class behaviour in workers.
Preconditions. Vulnerable PHP version; HTTP reachability to PHP SAPI.
Attack surface. PHP interpreter before application logic (mod_php cited as highest concern).
Security implications. Host compromise under pool OS user; lateral movement to databases and secrets on same host.
Detection opportunities. php-fpm segfault rate; unexpected processes from www-data; KEV listing requires patch evidence.
Defensive controls. CONTROL-002; upgrade to PHP 8.2.35+ / 8.3.36+ / 8.4.27+ / 8.5.12+.
{"module":"MOD-VULN-PHP-001","canonical_record":"CVE-2026-109618","file":"vulnerabilities.jsonl"}{"module":"MOD-VULN-PHP-001","canonical_record":"CVE-2026-109619","file":"vulnerabilities.jsonl"}MOD-VULN-NET-001 | Edge mail and security appliances (2026)
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-VULN-NET-001 |
| Category | vulnerability |
| Subject | Unauthenticated file write on mail security products |
| Technologies | FortiMail, Cisco Secure Email Gateway |
| Related CVEs | CVE-2026-104286, CVE-2026-76519 |
| Sources | SOURCE-004, SOURCE-005, SOURCE-003 |
Preconditions (CVE-2026-76519). File Reputation enabled; Content Scanner Tools earlier than 25.3.0.5525.
Attack surface. Internet-reachable appliance HTTP or inbound SMTP with AMP scanning.
Detection opportunities. Appliance integrity monitoring; Cisco-documented compromise indicators; version scanning.
Defensive controls. CONTROL-002; vendor patches; remove appliance from public internet during emergency.
MOD-INC-FIN-001 | Binance October 2026
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-INC-FIN-001 |
| Category | incident |
| Subject | Exchange hot wallet and signing pipeline |
| Technologies | internal signing service, EIP-7702, multi-chain wallets |
| Related CVEs | none confirmed in operator reporting |
| Canonical ID | INCIDENT-2026-001 |
| Sources | SOURCE-006, SOURCE-007 |
Initial access (operator-reported). Unauthorized access to internal wallet signing service. Additional breach points under investigation per operator statements.
Attack techniques (documented). Valid signed transfers; EIP-7702 delegations persisted after withdrawal UI suspension.
Security implications. Transaction authorization is a distinct boundary from application withdrawal toggles.
Defensive controls. CONTROL-003; on-chain delegation monitoring.
Confidence. medium (active investigation; operator-sourced timeline).
{"module":"MOD-INC-FIN-001","canonical_record":"INCIDENT-2026-001","file":"incidents.jsonl"}MOD-INC-FIN-002 | Bybit February 2025
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-INC-FIN-002 |
| Category | incident |
| Subject | Multisig workflow compromise via supplier |
| Technologies | Safe{Wallet}, AWS S3 static site, multisig UI |
| Related CVEs | none on Bybit application |
| Canonical ID | INCIDENT-2025-002 |
| Sources | SOURCE-008, SOURCE-016 |
Initial access. Safe{Wallet} developer workstation compromise via social engineering lure (documented timeline).
MITRE ATT&CK (mapped in record). T1566, T1078 where sourced to stolen session tokens.
Identity compromise. AWS session tokens from developer laptop.
Defensive controls. CONTROL-004, CONTROL-001.
Confidence. high for supplier chain; attribution to DPRK groups is threat-research assessment.
{"module":"MOD-INC-FIN-002","canonical_record":"INCIDENT-2025-002","file":"incidents.jsonl"}MOD-INC-CI-001 | Critical infrastructure and supply chain incidents
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-INC-CI-001 |
| Category | incident |
| Subject | OT, MFT, vendor update trust |
| Technologies | VPN, MOVEit, SolarWinds Orion, xz/liblzma |
| Related CVEs | CVE-2023-34362, CVE-2020-10148, CVE-2024-3094 |
| Canonical IDs | INCIDENT-2021-001, INCIDENT-2023-001, INCIDENT-2020-001, INCIDENT-2024-001 |
| Sources | SOURCE-009, SOURCE-010, SOURCE-011, SOURCE-012 |
Colonial Pipeline (INCIDENT-2021-001). Initial access: compromised VPN password without MFA. Not a CVE-led exploit.
MOVEit campaign (INCIDENT-2023-001). Initial access: CVE-2023-34362; technique T1190.
SolarWinds (INCIDENT-2020-001). Initial access: trojaned Orion update; technique T1195.002.
XZ Utils (INCIDENT-2024-001). Supply-chain maintainer compromise; CVE-2024-3094; detected before mass shipment.
Defensive controls. CONTROL-005, CONTROL-004, CONTROL-002.
MOD-INFRA-OT-001 | IT/OT model
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-INFRA-OT-001 |
| Category | infrastructure |
| Subject | OT dependency graph |
| Technologies | SCADA, PLC, HMI, RTU, engineering workstation, SIS |
| Related incidents | INCIDENT-2021-001 |
| Sources | SOURCE-009 |
IT/OT boundary. Corporate IT compromise can force OT operational shutdown without direct PLC exploit.
Single points of failure. Shared remote access gateways; historian accessible from IT VLAN.
Availability constraints. Patching windows differ; OT may rely on network deny rules instead of rapid patch.
Related controls. CONTROL-005.
{
"source": "SECTOR-energy",
"relationship": "depends_on",
"target": "CONTROL-005",
"evidence": ["SOURCE-009"],
"confidence": "high"
}MOD-AI-001 | AI agent security
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-AI-001 |
| Category | ai_security |
| Subject | LLM and autonomous agent risks |
| Technologies | SOC agents, RAG pipelines, tool-calling orchestrators |
| Related controls | CONTROL-006 |
| Sources | SOURCE-015 |
Risk AGENT-PROMPT-INJECTION
| # | Attribute |
|---|---|
| Attack surface | Untrusted user or document content in agent context |
| Preconditions | Agent has tools beyond read-only |
| Failure mechanism | Adversarial instructions override system policy |
| Potential impact | Data exfiltration, destructive API calls |
| Security boundary | Application orchestration layer |
| Preventive control | Tool allow-list, policy-as-code, separate privilege tier |
| Detection method | Log anomalous tool invocations; output guardrails |
| Recovery procedure | Revoke agent credentials; rotate secrets; audit retrieval index |
Risk AGENT-RETRIEVAL-POISONING
| # | Attribute |
|---|---|
| Attack surface | Vector store or chunk upload path |
| Preconditions | Write access to corpus without integrity checks |
| Failure mechanism | Malicious chunks steer answers and tool selection |
| Preventive control | Signed chunks; provenance metadata; separate corpora per classification |
No public evidence attributes INCIDENT-2026-001 or INCIDENT-2025-002 to autonomous AI execution without human operators.
MOD-REG-EU-001 | European regulatory linkage
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-REG-EU-001 |
| Category | regulation |
| Subject | NIS2 technical measures mapping |
| Entity IDs | REG-NIS2, REG-NIS2-PT |
| Sources | SOURCE-013, SOURCE-014 |
NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555). Risk management measures include incident handling, supply chain security, cryptography, vulnerability handling, authentication (Article 21).
Portugal. Decreto-Lei 125/2025 transposes NIS2; CNCS qualification via MyCiber (see part 1 human article for timelines).
Mapping (not legal advice).
{"source":"REG-NIS2","relationship":"requires","target":"CONTROL-001","evidence":["SOURCE-013"],"confidence":"high"}{"source":"REG-NIS2","relationship":"requires","target":"CONTROL-002","evidence":["SOURCE-013"],"confidence":"high"}DORA, CER, CRA, AI Act: extend relationships.jsonl in future dataset revisions with article-level citations before adding controls.
MOD-TAX-ATTACK-001 | Technique taxonomy usage
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module ID | MOD-TAX-ATTACK-001 |
| Category | taxonomy |
| Subject | MITRE ATT&CK and CWE usage rules |
| Sources | SOURCE-016 |
Rules for agents.
- Read
mitre_attack_idsonly fromincidents.jsonlrecords. - Map vulnerabilities to T1190 only when exploitation is via public application interface and record includes that mapping.
- CVSS measures technical severity for a CVE snapshot.
- EPSS scores exploitation probability; include
epssdate in vulnerabilities.jsonl when present. - CISA KEV boolean
kev_statusmeans catalog inclusion, not organisational patch status.
MOD-INDEX-001 | Entity resolution index
Full index: entities.json. Glossary keys: KEV, EPSS, PHP2Shell, EIP7702.
| Entity | Type | Modules |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-109618 | vulnerability | MOD-VULN-PHP-001 |
| INCIDENT-2026-001 | incident | MOD-INC-FIN-001 |
| INCIDENT-2025-002 | incident | MOD-INC-FIN-002 |
| REG-NIS2 | regulation | MOD-REG-EU-001 |
| CONTROL-003 | control | MOD-INC-FIN-001 |
MOD-QUERY-001 | Example agent queries
| Query | Retrieval path |
|---|---|
| Which CVEs are KEV-listed in this dataset? | Filter vulnerabilities.jsonl where kev_status is true |
| Which incidents used stolen developer credentials? | Filter incidents.jsonl initial_access / identity_compromise fields |
| Which controls mitigate T1190? | Join controls.jsonl attack_techniques_mitigated |
| Which products affect financial signing? | Graph walk from INCIDENT-2026-001 to CONTROL-003 via relationships.jsonl |
| Emergency patch list | Union KEV true vulnerabilities with internet-facing asset inventory (external CMDB) |
MOD-REF-001 | Primary references
All claims must resolve to sources.jsonl. Publisher types: cve, government, vendor_psirt, operator_report, threat_research, law, framework.
Human-readable part 1: Critical infrastructure cyber attacks (2020-2026).
Download machine files:
/cyber-intelligence/part-2/vulnerabilities.jsonl/cyber-intelligence/part-2/incidents.jsonl/cyber-intelligence/part-2/controls.jsonl/cyber-intelligence/part-2/relationships.jsonl/cyber-intelligence/part-2/sources.jsonl/cyber-intelligence/part-2/entities.json
Integre este dataset no vosso fluxo de engenharia de segurança.
Ajudamos a mapear o schema JSONL ao CMDB, SIEM e orquestração de agentes, com revisão de arquitectura sem claims de certificação.
